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A PRIMER ON RISK 
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 
FOR LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS 
Preface 
This primer is addressed to judges, parole board members, and other legal decision-
makers who use or are considering using the results of risk assessment instruments (RAIs) in 
making determinations about post-conviction dispositions, as well as to legislators and 
executive officials responsible for authorizing such use.* It is meant to help these decision-
makers determine whether a particular RAI is an appropriate basis for legal determinations and 
whether evaluators who rely on an RAI have done so properly.  This primer does not take a 
position on whether RAIs should be integrated into the criminal process.  Rather, it provides 
legal decision-makers with information about how RAIs are constructed and the types of 
information they provide, with the goal of facilitating their intelligent selection and use.  
The work on the Primer was funded by the Charles H. Koch Foundation.  It involved 
consultation with a number of experts on risk assessment, including Dr. Sarah Desmarais, a 
psychologist and professor at North Carolina State University; Brandon Garrett, a law professor 
at Duke Law School; Melissa Hamilton, a law professor at the University of Surrey; Dr. Rhys 
Hester, a sociologist, lawyer and professor at Clemson University; Cecelia Klingele, a law 
professor at the University of Wisconsin; Sandra Mayson, a law professor at the University of 
Georgia Law School; Dr. John Monahan, a psychologist and professor at the University of Virginia 
Law School; Michael O’Hear, a law professor at Marquette Law School; Kevin Reitz, a law 
professor at the University of Minnesota Law School; Dr. Jennifer Skeem, a psychologist and 
professor at the University of California, Berkeley; and Dr. Megan Stevenson, an economist and 
professor at the University of Virginia Law School.  However, the ultimate responsibility for this 
work falls on the author of the Primer, Christopher Slobogin, law professor at Vanderbilt 
University.  Any errors in concept or fact are his, and his alone.  
  
 
* Much of what is said here could be relevant to use of risk assessment instruments during the pretrial process as well, but this 
primer is directly solely at decision-makers involved with risk assessment in the post-conviction process.   
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WHAT ARE RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS? 
 The term “risk assessment” encom-
passes a number of different practices that differ 
in the extent to which they: (1) rely on 
empirically-valid risk and protective factors (i.e., 
factors that statistically correlate with an 
elevated or reduced risk of reoffending); (2) use 
a structured method for measuring these risk 
and protective factors; (3) establish a procedure 
for combining scores on the individual risk and 
protective factors into a total score; and (4) 
produce a final estimate of risk.1  Clinical risk 
assessment—in many settings, the traditional 
and still typical method used by many judges, 
parole boards and mental health professionals—
structures none of these components; rather an 
estimate of risk is based on experience and 
perhaps intuition, and the factors considered 
may vary from case-to-case, and be applied 
differently in different cases.  Checklist risk 
assessment provides structure on the first 
component, by listing the factors that should be 
considered.  Structured professional judgment 
(SPJ) risk assessment satisfies the first two 
components, by providing a list of factors and 
indicating how they should be measured (e.g., on 
a scale of 0-2), but avoids combining these 
measures for a total score, instead counselling 
that the item ratings be considered merely in 
arriving at an overall conclusion about risk.  
Adjusted actuarial risk assessment lists the 
factors, describes how they should be measured, 
and produces a total score, but allows evaluators 
to adjust or modify the score based on clinical 
judgment that is not structured by the 
instrument. Stand-alone actuarial risk 
assessment does not permit such adjustments, 
but rather produces a probability estimate that 
is considered final.   
 The term “risk assessment instrument,” 
as used here, applies only to the last three types 
of practices.   An example of an SPJ instrument is 
the HCR-20, version3 (hereafter, HCR-20), which 
is composed of 20 items, rated on a scale of 0-2.2  
Examples of adjusted actuarial instruments are 
the Correctional Offender Management Profiling 
for Alternative Sanctions tool (COMPAS),3 and 
the Legal Service/Case Management Inventory 
(hereafter, LSCMI).4 Examples of actuarial 
instruments are the Violence Risk Appraisal 
Guide-Revised (hereafter, VRAG),5 Virginia’s 
Non-Violent Risk Assessment (NVRA),6 and the 
STATIC-99.7  These examples are fluid, however.  
For instance, if evaluators so choose, the LSCMI 
can be used as an actuarial instrument, and the 
scores on the VRAG and STATIC-99 can be 
adjusted.   
RAIs are based on research that tries to 
identify factors that correlate with risk. Typical 
risk factors in RAIs include criminal history, 
diagnosis, criminal attitudes, school and work 
status, and substance use.8  Risk factors are 
sometimes distinguished in terms of whether 
they are “static” (unchanging) or “dynamic” 
(changeable).  Some RAIs also claim to identify 
“needs,” which, properly defined, are dynamic 
factors that, if changed, reduce risk.  For 
instance, employment status and substance 
abuse are dynamic factors that can be helpful in 
estimating risk but, to date, only substance 
abuse has clearly been shown to be a 
criminogenic need—that is, one that, if 
successfully treated, reduces risk.9 
CONTROVERSIES OVER RISK ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENTS 
As indicated in the preface, this primer 
does not take a position on whether RAIs should 
be used in the criminal justice system.  However, 
legal decision-makers who use or are considering 
using these tools should have some 
understanding of the criticisms of RAIs and how 
RAI proponents have responded to these 
criticisms.  The criticisms, and the responses to 
them, are organized here under six headings: 
assessing individual cases based on group data; 
the helpfulness of RAIs to lay decision-makers; 
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racial disparities; use of uncontrollable factors; 
dispositional consequences; and procedural 
concerns. 
Assessing Individual Cases Based on Group Data    
RAIs—especially those that are 
actuarial—have been criticized on the ground 
that research about groups cannot predict 
whether a given individual will reoffend.  As one 
judge put this point, “[n]ot only are  . . . statistics 
concerning the violent behavior of others 
irrelevant, but it seems to me wrong to confine 
any person on the basis not of that persons’ own 
prior conduct but on the basis of statistical 
evidence regarding the behavior of other 
people.”10  This issue has been called the “G2i” 
problem, the application of general information 
to individual cases.11   
The statistical argument purporting to 
support the stance that G2i is not possible has 
been debunked by noted statisticians Peter 
Imrey and Philip Dawid, who find it “seriously 
mistaken in many particulars” and who conclude 
that it should “play no role in reasoned 
discussions about violence recidivism risk 
assessment.”12  Other commentators have 
pointed out that, if these assertions were true, 
any type of expert testimony—whether or not 
empirically based—would be suspect.13  Even a 
clinical risk assessment by a judge or mental 
health professional relies—consciously or not—
on stereotypes, past experiences with “similar” 
individuals, and lessons learned from the 
literature about groups.  As one commentator 
noted:  “Although the clinician need not identify 
in advance the characteristics he will regard as 
salient, he must nevertheless evaluate the 
applicant on the basis of a finite number of 
salient characteristics, and thus, like the 
statistical decisionmaker, he treats the applicant 
as a member of a class defined by those 
characteristics.”14 
However, the fact that the G2i 
phenomenon  is unavoidable does have 
implications for how to frame prediction results.  
A conclusion based on an RAI (or any other 
conclusion about risk) should not purport to say 
that a person will, or will not, reoffend—a fact 
that, in almost all cases, is unknowable.  Nor 
should it state that a particular offender has X 
probability of reoffending.  Rather, an evaluator 
using an RAI to estimate the risk an offender 
poses should report that the offender received a 
risk score that is consistent with the scores of a 
group, X percent of which offended in the past.15   
The Helpfulness of RAIs   
The statistical expertise needed to put 
together an actuarial RAI and the familiarity with 
research literature that goes into the creation of 
SPJ instruments requires a significant amount of 
specialized knowledge.  But if judges or lay-
parole boards are able to figure out who will 
reoffend as accurately as evaluators using RAIs, 
then arguably that specialized knowledge is not 
helpful to the factfinder.  One study purported to 
find that the COMPAS “is no more accurate or 
fair than predictions made by people with little 
or no criminal justice expertise.”16  Specifically it 
found, based on a comparison of COMPAS and 
human predictions for 1,000 defendants, that 
while the COMPAS was correct in 65% of the 
cases, humans were correct in about 62% of the 
cases.17   
However, others have pointed out that 
the 50 mini-vignettes shown to the lay subjects 
in this study listed only a few features of the 
defendant, all of which have a robust statistical 
relationship with reoffending; in effect the 
subjects were provided a “checklist” RAI.  
Further, immediately after each prediction, the 
subjects were told whether they were right or 
wrong, feedback that a judge or parole board 
never receives but which, in the study, “trained” 
the participants about the most pertinent traits 
and how they are related to recidivism.18  A 
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follow-up study found that when lay participants 
are not provided feedback, they do much more 
poorly than an RAI, even when they are given 
base rate information about the average rate of 
offending of the population in question.19  The 
authors of this study also found that when the 
information given the humans was “noisier” 
(that is, when a much richer set of facts was 
provided than the barebones list of traits 
provided in the original study), the lay subjects 
did barely better than chance, whereas the 
statistical model the authors created was much 
better at distinguishing recidivists and non-
recidivists.20    
These types of results replicate a large 
number of other studies finding that algorithms 
typically outperform human predictions, 
whether the latter are made by laypeople or 
trained clinicians.21  For instance, a 2006 meta-
analysis of 41 studies found that actuarial 
techniques routinely did better than clinical 
methods in every area investigated, and that 
with respect to predicting violent or criminal 
behavior in particular, the actuarial approach 
was “clearly superior to the clinical approach.”22  
The study also found that even subsets of “best 
professionals” designated as experts did not 
outperform statistical formulae.23  Several 
studies that compare algorithms to judges, 
clinicians, and correctional officers obtain similar 
results, probably because, despite their official 
position, the decisions of these groups are often 
like other peoples’—largely intuitive, heuristic-
based, subject to bias, and inattentive to base 
rates.24  This research calls into question both 
clinical risk assessment and actuarial assessment 
that is adjusted, at least when the adjustments 
are not based on empirical research or on 
obvious anomalies (such as when a person 
designated as high risk for violence has since 
 
† The percentage of people who did not recidivate but had 
been predicted to recidivate (i.e., given a positive 
prediction). 
become disabled, or when a person considered 
low risk voices a genuine threat to another).25   
Of course, the advantages of RAIs over 
clinical judgment are lost if they are poorly 
constructed.  The validity of an RAI can be 
measured in several ways.  Further, RAIs must 
also be validated and re-validated on the 
relevant populations.  These means of gauging 
accuracy are described further below. 
Racial Disparities   
Risk assessment instruments might be 
considered unfair on a number of grounds.  Most 
prominently, critics have argued that RAIs can 
perpetuate racially disparate effects.  For 
instance, RAIs may be developed using criminal 
arrest history that, because of racialized police 
practices, overestimates the actual crime rates 
by people of color, and therefore may produce 
results indicating that this group is higher risk 
than it actually is.26  Further, research has shown 
that even RAIs that assign risk levels relatively 
accurately across races can produce higher “false 
positive rates”† for blacks than for whites, and 
higher “false negative rates”‡ for whites than 
blacks; if so, a higher proportion of blacks could 
be wrongly incarcerated or receive enhanced 
sentences, while a higher proportion of whites 
could be released and reoffend. More generally, 
risk factors such as employment status, socio-
economic status, or location may correlate with 
race, which some critics argue should render 
reliance on such factors impermissible, and 
perhaps even unconstitutional.27   
To some extent, the effects of racialized 
policing can be neutralized.  For instance, some 
algorithms refrain from predicting arrests for 
minor drug offenses and non-violent mis-
demeanors, while others develop separate risk 
categories for different racial groups, and still 
‡The percentage of people who recidivated but had been 




others exclude risk factors that are not equally 
predictive across racial groups.28   Unfortunately, 
higher false positive rates for blacks are 
inevitable as a statistical matter if, as some 
research shows,29 the recidivism rate is higher 
among blacks than whites.30 Further, adjusting 
scores in an effort to equalize false positive and 
false negative rates across races will decrease 
the accuracy of RAIs by over-estimating the risk 
posed by whites and under-estimating the risk 
posed by blacks; in any event, simultaneous 
equalization of both false positive and false 
negative rates may be impossible.31  And under 
current constitutional doctrine, unintentional 
disparate racial impact does not violate the 
equal protection clause,32 especially if the risk 
factors that correlate with race meaningfully 
improve accuracy and thus help achieve the 
state’s interest in protecting the public.33   
Finally, consistent with the research 
showing that RAIs are generally more accurate 
than clinical judgment, several studies indicate 
that human adjustments to RAIs increase racially 
disparate outcomes.34 It may be that structured 
risk assessment is better at avoiding such 
outcomes than unaided human decision-
makers.35  Further, because the workings of an 
algorithm are more transparent than those of 
the human mind, if racially disparate impacts are 
discovered, they are more easily corrected using 
RAIs.36  As Sendhil Mullainathan has noted, 
“biased algorithms are easier to fix than biased 
people.”37   
Use of Uncontrollable Factors.    
A related criticism of RAIs is that many of 
their risk factors do not describe blameworthy 
conduct.  For instance, although no RAI explicitly 
uses race as a risk factor, several use sex (with 
maleness increasing the risk score), age (with 
youth increasing the risk score), diagnosis (with 
certain personality disorders increasing the risk 
score), and early childhood experiences (with 
abuse and parental absence increasing the risk 
score).  Critics argue that punishment should not 
be enhanced because of such factors, or even by 
factors such as “criminal attitudes” and 
impulsivity, since they are not per se criminal.38 
 At the same time, the courts have long 
recognized that post-conviction dispositional 
decisions—including the death penalty—may  be 
based in part on a risk assessment;39 if so, a risk-
based disposition that is not prolonged beyond 
what an offender fairly deserves under the 
relevant sentencing scheme should be 
permissible even if based in whole or part on 
non-blameworthy factors.40  It has also been 
argued that risk-based dispositions are imposed 
not because a person is young, male, or has a 
particular personality disorder, but because 
these factors, along with others, indicate that 
the person is more (or less) likely to choose to 
commit a blameworthy act in the future.41  
Viewed this way, risk factors are merely 
circumstantial evidence about future 
blameworthiness. Finally—repeating the 
comparative theme—even non-empirical risk 
assessments undoubtedly rely, consciously or 
not, on such factors.  
 It is sometimes stated that, as long as a 
risk assessment is used only to identify lower risk 
offenders who can be given a reduced sentence 
or diverted from imprisonment altogether, 
concerns about the use of particular risk factors 
are alleviated.42  However, the tension between 
risk and desert is not that easily resolved.  For 
instance, a jurisdiction that lowers the sentence 
of an older woman who is married based on 
those factors is, in effect, raising the sentence of 
a younger, single male.   A regime that favors low 
risk offenders automatically disfavors high-risk 
offenders.  
Dispositional Consequences 
 An over-arching concern about using 
RAIs is that they will make risk a more salient 
consideration during the post-conviction 
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process, to the detriment of achieving other 
punishment goals.43  The focus will become 
reduction of recidivism rather than 
proportionate punishment based on just desert, 
general deterrence, rehabilitation or other, 
more broad-based efforts to reduce crime 
through social programs.   Further, that focus 
could lead to an increase in imprisonment and 
sentence lengths, given the fact that all 
offenders pose some risk if released. Finally, 
there is the concern that, because they control 
the construction of RAIs, tool developers, not 
policymakers, will control the definition of risk.44 
 Proponents of RAIs respond that, while 
all of this is a possible effect of increased reliance 
on RAIs, the more likely impact is a reduction in 
incarceration rates and sentence lengths, and an 
increase in rehabilitative services.45  For 
instance, researchers with bipartisan credentials 
who audited the compositions of the prison 
populations in three states estimated that, if 
danger to the community were the only 
justification for continued confinement, roughly 
half the prisoners would be released.46  If low risk 
is defined as those posing a risk of violent crime 
below the average risk posed by offenders, and 
this group is either not imprisoned or imprisoned 
for the minimum term, incarceration 
populations are likely to be significantly reduced, 
for people of color as well as other groups;47 
research shows that recidivism among low risk 
individuals actually diminishes if imprisonment 
and enhanced surveillance are avoided.48  
Further, to the extent RAIs identify criminogenic 
needs, they can facilitate assignment to 
treatment programs.  As these examples 
illustrate, policymakers, not RAI developers, 
must dictate the specifications of the 
instruments.49 
Procedural Concerns   
Even if RAIs are relevant and helpful, and 
their use does not violate equality or punish-
ment norms, some critics express worry that the 
quantified nature of RAIs, and the fact that their 
inner workings are not easily understood, 
undermines the procedural fairness of the risk 
determination.50  Basing a risk assessment on a 
finite number of factors and, when the 
assessment is actuarial in nature, on a risk or 
probability score, may seem antithetical to an 
“individualized” evaluation of the person.  
Further, to the extent the algorithm is not 
transparent—which may occur either because it 
was developed by a private company claiming 
trade secret protection or because the RAI is 
based on deep machine learning (artificial 
intelligence) techniques—independent due 
process concerns arise.51  These challenges are 
exacerbated if, as is true in most jurisdictions, 
the rules governing admissibility of scientific 
evidence, such as those developed under 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,52 do 
not apply post-conviction, and if, as is true with 
parole hearings, the proceeding is informal, with 
no right to counsel. 
The extent to which these challenges 
can be overcome depends upon the law and 
practice in a given jurisdiction.  At a minimum, 
the subject of the risk assessment should always 
be able to contest the accuracy of conclusions 
that a given risk factor (such as a particular 
arrest) applies, as well as the way in which the 
risk factors are combined.   Legal decision-
makers can assist in this process, especially when 
counsel is not present.  Explanations of the risk 
assessment process should also be provided, and 
the workings of the RAI should be made as 
transparent as possible.  Perhaps most 
importantly, the validity of any given RAI used by 
the state should be subject to peer review and 
testing before it is relied on to make legal 
decisions, which can help minimize concerns 
about the informality of the post-conviction 




GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF RISK ASSESSMENT 
 With these controversies in mind, and as explained further in the next section, several general 
principles should govern the criminal justice system’s reliance on risk assessment instruments (RAIs) 
during the post-conviction process.     
1. Legal policymakers (legislatures, executive agencies or courts) should define the threshold 
and nature of the risk that is relevant for each risk assessment setting (e.g., sentencing, 
parole release, within-in prison management).  Policymakers should not cede this authority 
to the developers of RAIs. 
2. Developers of RAIs should provide validation data indicating: (a) the proportion of people 
within each risk category or with a given risk score who reoffend, as defined under principle 
1; (b) the ability of the RAI to discriminate between recidivists and non-recidivists above 
chance levels; and (c) inter-rater reliability (agreement between different evaluators). 
3. The validation data should, if possible, be based on a population from the jurisdiction in 
question and report data about the validity measures described in principle 2 for men, 
women, different ethnicities and other important demographic groups.   
4. Jurisdictions should verify the predictive validity and inter-rater reliability data described in 
principles 2 and 3 through a peer-review process that is independent from the developer of 
the RAI and that has access to the developer’s inputs, statistical analysis, and outcome data. 
5. Jurisdictions should re-validate the RAI after significant changes in the relevant population, 
the rate of crime, and norms or policies that are likely to affect recidivism rates 
substantially.  
6. Risk estimates based on an RAI should be expressed in terms of membership in a group with 
a specified recidivism rate, not in terms of whether a particular person will or will not 
recidivate. 
7. In estimating risk, the results of a validated risk assessment instrument are preferable to a 
clinical judgment about risk and should be given presumptive, but rebuttable, effect. 
8. Legal decision-makers and evaluators should be trained in the use of RAIs to the extent they 
are responsible for obtaining and analyzing their results.  
9. In individual cases, the risk factors and the way in which they influence the ultimate 
conclusion on risk should be available to the parties and subject to adversarial testing.  
10. The results of a risk assessment should not lengthen a sentence beyond the maximum 
punishment that the legislature has determined is appropriate for the offense of conviction. 
11. To the extent consistent with just desert, general deterrence and other punishment 
considerations, decision-makers charged with responding to a risk assessment should 
impose the least burdensome measures that can sufficiently address risk, which may mean, 
for instance, that offenders considered to be lower risk are subject to little or no 
intervention.   
12. When consistent with other goals of punishment, legal decision-makers should consider 
supportive measures to reduce risk, including access to treatment, education or social 
services. To this end, RAI developers should endeavor to include variable or dynamic risk 
factors that have been shown empirically to predict re-offending and to be changeable 
through intervention. 
The queries highlighted below elaborate on these principles. 
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ISSUES THAT LEGAL DECISION-MAKERS USING 
RAIS SHOULD CONSIDER 
 The following material expands on these 
principles, organized around 15 questions about 
RAIs that relate to their (1) relevance, (2) 
accuracy, and (3) fairness.  Whether these 
queries are resolved on a case-by-case or 
jurisdiction-wide basis will depend upon the law 
and practice of the jurisdiction. 
Relevance/Fit 
 In evaluating the results of an RAI, the 
legal decision-maker should ascertain whether 
the information it provides is pertinent to the 
legal issue in question, with respect to: (1) the 
probability of reoffending; (2) the type of 
reoffending predicted; (3) the time frame 
within which the reoffending will occur; and (4) 
the intervention(s) that are likely to reduce the 
predicted risk.  
1. Does the RAI provide information about 
the probability that a person within the 
individual’s risk category will recidivate? 
As noted above, the most accurate way 
to designate a person’s risk level is by associating 
the person with a group, as in “research 
indicates that approximately 30% of the people 
with this person’s risk score recidivated in the 
absence of risk-reducing intervention.”  This 
probability is also the most useful information 
for the binary decision that a judge makes about 
whether a person should be sent to prison or 
diverted to an alternative, or that a parole board 
makes in deciding whether to release a prisoner.  
Ideally, as principle #1 indicates, the legislature 
or appellate jurisprudence would assist in that 
endeavor by providing probability thresholds 
appropriate for the legal setting (which might 
vary depending on whether sentencing, parole, 
or within-prison dispositions are involved), after 
considering the associated false positive and 
false negative rates, and the accompanying 
imprisonment and treatment costs.   
Unfortunately, in-depth analysis of this 
sort has, to date, been rare.  To the extent a 
jurisdiction’s law defines dangerousness in the 
sentencing context, it is usually very imprecise.  
For instance, the relevant law might describe the 
relevant threshold as a “probability” or 
“significant possibility” of reoffending, without 
further elaboration.53   
With the advent of RAIs, risk can be 
quantified more precisely.  Not all RAI 
developers take advantage of this capability, 
however.  Instead, evidence of risk is often 
limited to statements about whether the 
offender is “high risk,” “medium risk” or “low 
risk” (as occurs under the HCR-20) or a 
description of the offender’s “risk decile” (as 
provided by the COMPAS).  These statements do 
not reveal the specific group-based probabilities 
associated with, respectively, the instruments’ 
risk designation or decile.   
Legal decision-makers should seek out 
such information rather than rely on categorical 
designations such as “high” or “low” risk.  
Otherwise, there is a significant chance they will 
be misled.  For instance, surveys that ask 
clinicians and judges how they define “high risk” 
show tremendous variation.  The average 
percentage associated with that phrase falls 
somewhere between 60 and 70%, but the range 
of answers varies from 5% to 100% and the 
variability between raters is very high.54  One 
study of evaluators found that the probability of 
recidivating associated with a “moderate-high” 
rating was more than twice the actual recidivism 
rate of those groups.55  Similarly, the decile 
designation does not provide sufficient 
information about probabilities.  For instance, 
“third decile” on the COMPAS does not refer to 
a group, 30% of whom will recidivate, but rather 
a group that, in the validation sample, posed a 
lower risk than roughly 70% of the sample; 
because even the highest decile group on the 
COMPAS is associated with a probability of 
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reoffending considerably lower than 100%, the 
third decile group is very likely associated with a 
reoffending risk much lower than 30%.  
2. Is the type of conduct that the RAI 
predicts relevant to the legal decision at 
issue? 
Just as the law often only vaguely 
defines the probability threshold, it may not 
indicate the outcome measure or outcome 
variable of interest for the legal setting in 
question.  Should the person be considered 
“dangerous” for legal purposes if it is shown, 
with the requisite probability, that someone in 
the person’s risk category will be arrested for any 
offense? Or only if the person will be convicted 
for a violent offense?  And, if the latter, how is 
violence defined?   These questions are not 
always answered in the relevant legislation or 
caselaw.  If not, legal decision-makers evaluating 
individual cases must make their own judgment 
about this issue. 
While many RAIs provide probabilities 
for both “general recidivism” and “violent 
recidivism,” many define those terms very 
broadly.   General recidivism, for instance, could 
be defined in terms of arrest for any crime (as is 
the case for the COMPAS, for instance).  Other 
RAIs might include as the outcome variable 
infractions of prison disciplinary rules.  In such 
cases, the legal decision-maker must ask 
whether the probability of re-arrest for a 
misdemeanor, or the commission of any prison 
infraction, even if high, justifies the legal 
intervention being considered (e.g., lengthened 
imprisonment).   
Additionally, for reasons suggested 
above, the decision-maker should keep in mind 
that using low-level arrests as an outcome 
measure can produce racially disparate results,56 
and that a sizeable number of arrests do not 
result in convictions.57 As a result, an RAI that 
relies on drug possession or misdemeanor 
arrests as an outcome variable may rate black 
defendants as higher risk than white defendants 
who will engage in similar criminal behavior.  
While that rating might be “validated” because 
blacks have been and will be arrested for more 
drug possession and misdemeanor crimes than 
whites, they in fact have not committed more 
such crimes, and so the risk differential between 
whites and blacks will not reflect reality.   
Violent offending can also be defined in 
many ways.58  Some RAIs include within this term 
any assault or threat of violence, while others 
may limit that term to homicide, rape, robbery 
and aggravated assault, or to crimes involving 
victim injury.  Again, the legal decision-maker 
should find out the outcome variable for the RAI 
in question and take that information into 
account when making a decision about whether 
a person poses sufficient risk to warrant 
different legal treatment.  It has been argued 
that, where significant deprivations of liberty are 
involved,59 violent crime is the appropriate 
outcome focus, a position that can significantly 
reduce the number of people considered high 
risk.60 
3. Is the time frame associated with the 
predicted conduct consistent with the 
legal decision at issue?  
In many legal settings, the legal decision-
maker is attempting to forecast reoffending 
within a limited period of time.  For instance, a 
judge may be sentencing an offender for a crime 
with a maximum sentence of one year, or a 
parole board may be considering the risk posed 
by an individual between the time of its decision 
and the next parole review period a year or two 
hence.  The risk information provided by some 
RAIs may not be relevant in such settings.  For 
instance, while the COMPAS provides probability 
estimates for a period of one to two years, the 
HCR-20’s time frame is two years, and the 
VRAG’s time frame is seven years. Legal decision-
makers should take this type of durational 
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criterion into account in making decisions based 
on the results of an RAI. 
4. Does the RAI provide information about
the effect of different types of
interventions on the individual’s risk
categorization?
An individual’s risk of reoffending can
vary enormously depending on the law’s 
response to the risk.  While imprisonment might 
substantially reduce risk, it may not be any more 
effective at doing so than placement in an 
effective substance abuse treatment program in 
the community, a vocational training program in 
a halfway house, or a job-release program 
coupled with an ankle monitor.  Some RAIs, like 
the HCR-20 and the LSCMI, attempt to provide 
information about an individual’s criminogenic 
needs that can help make such determinations. 
RAIs that focus solely on protective factors such 
as coping skills and supportive social networks 
are also available to legal decision-makers.61  
These RAIs can be very helpful in fashioning 
dispositions, although legal decision-makers 
should make sure to inquire about and attempt 
to take into account whether a given risk or 
needs factors is “causal,” in the sense that 
changing or responding to it will reduce risk (as 
opposed to merely “improve” a person). For 
instance, as noted earlier, while 
effective substance abuse treatment can have 
a significant impact on risk, standard 
psychotherapies are much less likely to do so. 
When the legal-decisionmaker is 
attempting to fashion a disposition to reduce 
risk, also possibly relevant is the considerable 
research that finds that incarceration can be 
criminogenic for a wide range of offenders, given 
the resulting loss of connection with family, jobs 
and community and the development of criminal 
networks that results from imprisonment.62  A 
significant amount of research indicates that 
risk-reducing treatment is often most effective 
when it takes place in the community.63 In part 
for these types of reasons, several 
commentators have proposed that, for 
individuals considered low risk, there be a 
presumption in favor of alternatives to prison or 
outright release.64 
Accuracy/Validity 
Legal decision-makers should seek 
assurances that RAIs on which they rely are 
valid (i.e., do what they purport to do) in the 
following senses: (1) calibration; (2) 
discrimination between high and low risk 
individuals; (3) local validation; and (4) inter-
rater reliability. Further, they should seek 
assurance that (5) these measures of validity 
are current.  Such assurances may come from 
outside entities (e.g., state agencies, 
independent peer reviewers, appellate courts); 
validity determinations do not necessarily need 
to be made by the legal decision-maker in 
individual cases.  However, legal decision-
makers should have an obligation to ensure 
that, in individual cases: (6) evaluators are 
trained in the use of the RAI and reliably score 
the RAI; and (7) any adjustments to the RAI 
score have a substantial empirical or legal basis. 
5. What evidence is provided about the
RAI’s calibration?
There are two primary means of
evaluating the accuracy or predictive validity of 
an algorithm:  “calibration” and “discriminant” 
validity.65  Calibration, discussed here, measures 
the extent to which a positive finding (that a 
person will recidivate) is correct, and the extent 
to which a negative finding (that a person will 
not recidivate) is correct.  Discriminant validity, 
discussed next, measures the extent to which an 
RAI has differentiated between recidivists and 
non-recidivists, and thus provides a measure of 
how much better than chance an RAI performs.   
Among tool developers, the positive 
predictive value (PPV) and negative predictive 
value (NPV) are often thought to be the most 
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relevant measures of calibration.66  The question 
the PPV answers is how often a tool’s prediction 
that someone will recidivate is correct, and the 
NPV indicates how often a tool’s prediction that 
a person will not recidivate is correct.  Usually 
the PPV is calculated with a confidence interval 
of 95% (meaning that the range provided by the 
interval has a 95% chance of correctly identifying 
the group’s risk level).   
For instance, using a sample dataset 
from the COMPAS which divided offenders into 
high, medium and low risk groups, Melissa 
Hamilton calculated that the PPV for those 
designated as a high risk of violent reoffending is 
49%, with a confidence interval range of 43% to 
55%;67 in other words, there is a 95% chance that 
a high risk score on the COMPAS is associated 
with a 43 to 55% probability of recidivating.* 
Hamilton also found that the NPV of the medium 
and low risk group examined together was 86%, 
with a confidence interval range of 85% to 87%, 
meaning that there is a 95% chance that a 
medium or low risk score is associated with an 
85 to 87% chance of not recidivating.68   When, 
instead, Hamilton lumped together the medium 
and high-risk groups, separate from the low risk 
group, the PPV with respect to whether the first 
group recidivated fell to 31% (29% to 34%) and 
the NPV with respect to whether the second 
group did not recidivate went up slightly to 89% 
(88% to 91%).69   
This example illustrates two important 
points.  First, the PPV and NPV can be 
manipulated by changing the cut-point (for 
instance, as Hamilton did, from the high category 
to the high-medium category combined). 
Second, to arrive at PPV and NPV, one has to 
assume that the cut-off, whatever it is, is 
equivalent to a prediction that the individuals in 
those groups will recidivate.  In fact, that is not 
what most RAIs claim to be doing, or at least not 
 
* It should be noted that the confidence interval range 
could skew toward over or under prediction, which 
what they should claim to be doing.  RAIs cannot 
identify who will recidivate and who will not 
recidivate.  Rather, as noted above, they can only 
associate a particular score or category with a 
group probability of reoffending.   
Thus, while PPV can help figure out how 
well an RAI is calibrated, a more legally relevant 
measure of calibration is what could be called 
the category positive predictive value, or 
category base rate (CBR),70 which answers the 
following three-part question:  (1) does the RAI 
associate a person with a category (a score, 
decile or risk group); (2) if so, what percentage of 
people in the category does it predict will 
recidivate in the way defined by the relevant law; 
and (3) to what extent is that percentage correct, 
as measured by validation studies and con-
fidence intervals? An example of this type of RAI 
is the VRAG.  That tool assigns people with cer-
tain scores to nine bins associated with specific 
ascending probability ranges of recidivating.   
From a legal perspective, the CBR is the 
key measure of validity.  RAIs that fail to provide 
CBRs obscure the normative decision about 
whether the risk an individual’s group poses 
warrants some type of legal intervention.  
Unfortunately, as discussed earlier, some RAIs 
do not use scores or other categories, or do so, 
but associate them only with deciles or 
undefined high, medium and low risk labels 
rather than with probabilities.   
In some cases, a policy-making body 
approves the cut-off scores, based on an 
assessment of CBR and other measures of 
validation. For instance, in Virginia, the 
legislature directed the state sentencing 
commission to develop an instrument that 
flagged the lowest 25% in terms of risk; the 
resulting instrument recommends alternatives 
to imprisonment for that group.71  Thus, the 
suggests that the reported proportion should be the focus 
of the risk assessment. 
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Virginia legislature mandated the legally 
relevant cut-off score that legal decision-makers 
should consider.  However, if this type of upper-
level policy decision has not taken place, the 
legal decision-maker should always endeavor to 
ascertain the CBR for an individual’s risk 
category.  
6. What evidence is provided about the 
ability of the RAI to differentiate 
between recidivists and non-recidivists? 
An RAI can have very good calibration—
that is, its probability forecasts may be borne 
out—but can still be of questionable predictive 
validity.  For instance, when a given sample has 
a low base rate of reoffending (say 5%), an RAI 
might do no better than “a naïve classifier that 
predicts that no one recidivates,”72 since such a 
classifier would be right 95% of the time. Yet the 
resulting classifications would be useless to 
decision-makers who want to separate those 
who are high risk from those who are not. In 
recognition of this problem, another measure of 
predictive validity, one that examines the extent 
to which an RAI can discriminate between high 
and low risk individuals independently of how 
accurately it identifies absolute risk levels, 
should be sought and provided.   
The most popular such measure is called 
the AUC, for Area Under the Curve.  The “curve” 
is created by plotting, for each point total or cut 
point (e.g., decile) of the instrument, the true 
positive rate or “sensitivity” (the rate at which 
those who recidivated received that score) 
against the true negative rate or “specificity” 
(the rate at which those who did not recidivate 
received that score).73  If the curve created by 
this plot is a diagonal, the AUC is .5, and 
represents a finding that the tool does no better 
than chance at designating those who 
recidivated from those who did not, whereas a 
curve that looks like an “r” would indicate a 
perfect ability to do so.   
Virtually all RAIs have AUCs above .5, 
with most developers reporting AUCs of .6 to 
.85.74  The latter figure means that, 85% of the 
time, a randomly selected recidivist receives a 
higher score on the tool than a randomly 
selected non-recidivist.  Social scientists have 
designated a .56 AUC as a small effect size, .64 as 
a moderate effect size, and .71 as a large effect 
size.75 Ultimately, however, the discriminant 
validity threshold should be legally determined. 
As an evidentiary matter, the AUC value 
can be thought of as a measure of relevance, 
which under the rules of every state requires 
that proffered evidence have a “tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action 
[here reoffending] more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the 
evidence.”76  Under this definition, the results of 
an RAI—even one with a useful PPV—that has an 
AUC of .5 or close to it might be considered 
irrelevant.  Such an instrument’s designation of 
someone as high risk or low risk is no more 
accurate than a random designation of 
individuals as either high or low risk (the 
proverbial coin flip).  An adequate AUC threshold 
might be particularly important to enforce in 
settings known to involve populations with low 
base rates of offending, such as offenders 
convicted of capital murder who will clearly be 
incarcerated for the foreseeable future.   
7. Has the RAI been validated on the 
jurisdiction’s population and with 
respect to important sub-groupings? 
An RAI is usually developed on half a 
sample (the development sample) and then 
tested on the other half of the sample (the 
validation sample) to see how well it performs.  
But to be optimally useful in jurisdictions outside 
of the one in which the RAI was developed, the 
RAI should perform well in those jurisdictions as 
well.77  One of the initial criticisms of the VRAG is 
that it was validated on a sample of incarcerated 
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white men with mental disability in Canada.  
Until it was tested on diverse populations in the 
United States, its validity with respect to those 
populations was suspect.78  Likewise, RAI 
validation should be attentive to the type of 
population that will be evaluated.  An RAI 
validated on a population of sex offenders, using 
sexual assault as the outcome variable, will be of 
limited use for assessing the risk of other types 
of offenders.79  An instrument validated on a 
sample in an urban area might not work well in 
rural areas with lower crime rates and fewer 
arrest and convictions.80   
Finally, calibration and discriminant 
validity should also be tested with respect to 
important demographic groups within the 
jurisdiction, to ensure predictive validity is 
maintained for those groups. Research for many 
of the most widely used instruments shows that 
calibration and discriminant validity do not vary 
significantly for most groups.81  But they can.  For 
instance, Hamilton demonstrates that, for the 
males in the COMPAS sample described in query 
#5, the CBR goes up for each of the ten deciles, 
meaning that the predicted probability of 
recidivism and the actual rate of recidivism for 
each decile are fairly closely aligned.  However, 
for the female part of the sample, the CBR does 
not align well with actual recidivism from the 
fourth decile on, and drops precipitously at the 
seventh through ten deciles (with females in the 
higher risk categories recidivating at a much 
lower rate than males).82   
AUC values can also differ depending on 
ethnicity.  Using the COMPAS sample, Hamilton 
calculated that the AUC for blacks (at the 95% 
confidence level) is .71 (.68 to .74), for whites .68 
(64 to .73) and for Hispanics .64 (.55 to .73).83  
For Hispanics, the AUC on the COMPAS comes 
perilously close to dipping below an acceptable 
level of relevance. In recognition of this type of 
problem, in 2018, the Canadian Supreme Court 
prohibited use of a risk assessment instrument 
that was validated on the majority population to 
assess the risk of a person from an indigenous 
group.84   
In short, to be valid, an RAI should have 
similar positive predictive values for each risk 
classification across as many major demographic 
groups as possible, and have a similar AUC for 
each demographic group as well.85  This may 
require separate instruments (with different risk 
factors) for some groups, such as people of color, 
women, and so on (the legal implications of 
which are discussed in connection with query 
#13 below).  Achieving this degree of validation 
can be difficult, because it requires large enough 
samples to arrive at statistically useful findings in 
each of these types of categories.  Nonetheless, 
from an empirical perspective, serious effort 
should be made to validate the RAI on a 
population as similar as possible to the 
offender’s reference group.  Otherwise, even a 
tool which, on its face, has satisfactory 
calibration and discriminant accuracy verges on 
being irrelevant, a possibility that several courts 
have noted.86   
8. What evidence is there concerning inter-
rater reliability of evaluators who use the 
RAI? 
To a social scientist, reliability means 
repeatability, the ability to produce similar 
results under similar circumstances.  An RAI that 
has good calibration, discriminant, and external 
validity may still not produce valid results if it 
cannot be administered reliably.  Some RAIs, like 
the HCR-20, rely on numerous “soft variables,” 
such as “lack of insight,” “negative attitudes,” 
and “impulsivity.”  These types of variables are 
subject to many interpretations.  Even more 
objective instruments, such as the VRAG, include 
items that can suffer from poor inter-rater 
reliability, such as the individual’s score on the 
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised and his or her 
psychiatric diagnosis. Unless evaluators measure 
these types of factors in a way that is consistent 
16 
 
with the how they were conceptualized by the 
tool’s developers, the chance that the same 
individual will receive different scores from 
different evaluators or that similar individuals 
will receive different scores from the same 
evaluator is significant.87   
A survey of 53 studies in 2013 found that 
only two reported inter-rater reliability.88  
Ideally, this information would be reported for 
every RAI.  An agreement ratio of 80% among 
raters is considered very good.89 
9. How current is the evidence supporting 
the RAI’s validity? 
All of the measures of accuracy 
discussed to this point can alter for a particular 
instrument if, for instance, the population on 
which the RAI was normed changes 
substantially, the jurisdiction’s crime, arrest or 
conviction rates go up or down significantly, or 
the jurisdiction begins implementing innovative 
alternatives to prison that can reduce risk.90  
Because the potential for offending is affected 
by these types of factors, a person rated high risk 
on an outdated instrument may actually belong 
to a group that is low risk, or vice versa.  For that 
reason, RAIs should be re-validated periodically.  
Many of the most prominent instruments have 
been revised based on new data.  For instance, 
Virginia’s sentencing RAIs have been re-
validated twice since 2001.91 
Other measures of current validity 
include case auditing and peer review.92 Tools 
tested in the field rarely do as well as they did 
during validation.  Periodic auditing of how they 
are implemented by evaluators is one way of 
ensuring RAIs are performing adequately.93  
Virginia, for instance, provides annual reports on 
its RAIs.94   
The best way to ensure current validity 
is through peer review, carried out by 
researchers who did not develop the instrument.  
University-based experts are often best situated 
to carry out this type of review. CBRs, AUCs and 
reliability data that have been replicated by such 
experts, ideally in the same setting in which the 
RAI is being used, instill confidence that the RAI 
is reliable in both the legal and scientific sense. 
10. Has the person or persons using the RAI 
been trained in its use, are the 
evaluator’s conclusions about the 
individual’s risk factors accurate, and is 
the risk score calculated properly? 
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states that 
the basis of expert testimony must derive from 
reliable methods and principles, “reliably 
applied.”95  While evidentiary rules like this one 
are not formally applicable to post-conviction 
proceedings in many jurisdictions, the basic 
principle should not be ignored where 
deprivations of liberty are at stake.  Applied to 
risk assessments, this language makes it 
incumbent on the decision-maker to ensure that 
the evaluator has been trained in using the 
particular RAI, and has relied on trustworthy 
information sources in gathering relevant data.96  
It also requires some assessment of whether the 
scoring and assignment of the individual to a 
particular risk group was carried out in a 
competent manner.    
11. If the legal decision-maker is 
contemplating “adjusting” the risk score, 
are there valid empirical or practical 
reasons for doing so that have not 
already been considered by the 
developers of the RAI? 
One survey of judges who use an RAI 
found that even those who were highly favorable 
toward the instrument “were still inclined to 
consider recommendations in the context of 
their own judicial intuition and experience, and 
would request information that was not included 
in the risk assessment instrument when they 
deemed this to be necessary.”97  The conclusion 
of one judge is typical:  “It’s important to 
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understand that it’s just a tool and that judges 
are the definitive answer.”98  The judicial 
decisions that have analyzed the use of RAIs at 
sentencing have likewise emphasized that the 
results of an RAI is but one factor to consider and 
should not be dispositive.99 
If these statements are merely meant to 
stress that sentencing judges should always 
consider other purposes of punishment besides 
risk and incapacitation, they are unremarkable.  
But if these statements are asserting that, even 
when focused solely on the question of risk, legal 
decision-makers should feel free to second-
guess the results of a well-validated RAI, they 
should be tempered with the knowledge that 
such adjustments can easily reduce accuracy.  
Consistent with the findings about RAIs’ 
incremental validity compared to decisions 
made by lay factfinders, evaluator and judicial 
adjustments usually do not improve on the 
actuarial assessment.  In fact, several studies find 
that professional “overrides” of an RAI’s risk 
estimate, whether by judges, probation officers 
or other correctional professionals, decrease 
accuracy in predicting offending.100  For 
example, based on a sample of 3,646 offenders, 
Guay & Parent found that adjustments to an RAI 
result made by probation officers were 
significantly less accurate than the unadjusted 
RAI.101  A study by Schmidt et al. found that 
professional overrides decreased predictive 
validity and usually increased risk level.102  The 
most recent study likewise found that overrides 
typically result in an “upward reshuffling” of risk, 
and a loss of predictive accuracy.103     
There are likely several explanations for 
these types of findings.  Adjustments may be 
based on unverified speculation about the traits 
that might affect risk, a belief that “special 
circumstances” (e.g., contriteness or surliness) 
warrant ignoring the risk score, or simple 
mistrust of quantified decision-making.104  Or 
they may stem from extraneous considerations. 
Erroneous adjustments upward, to a higher risk 
label, may be influenced by knowledge that a 
false negative decision, which results in release, 
is much more likely to be discovered than a false 
positive decision that results in incarceration; 
moreover, of course, the latter types of errors 
are much more likely to have professional and 
societal consequences.105  In contrast, erroneous 
decisions downward may reflect concern about 
whether sufficient treatment resources are 
available in prison; if not, judges have been 
known to opt for a prison alternative that 
appears to better serve the individual (although 
here the override is more likely to be warranted, 
if the RAI has not taken the community 
treatment into account).106  More generally, 
evaluators, judges, and parole board members 
might dislike the idea of having their decisions 
dictated by a table; as one Virginia judge put it, 
“I don’t do voodoo.”107  Unfortunately, because 
these adjustments to the RAI result are at best 
based on untested assumptions derived from 
experience, they may not only be wrong but also 
infected by racial and other biases, a possibility 
some courts have noted.108 
The dangers of adjusting a risk level in 
the absence of supporting research is 
particularly high with upward adjustments.109  
Most RAIs consist primarily of risk factors, not 
protective factors, so the reason for rating a 
person as a higher risk than the RAI indicates can 
easily be something that has already been taken 
into account.  One of the common mistakes in 
this regard is to “double-count” criminal history.   
For instance, a judge might decide that even 
though an RAI indicates an offender poses a low 
risk, the sentence should be enhanced because 
the offender has committed two prior offenses; 
research in Virginia indicates that is precisely 
what happens there.110  Since every RAI already 
incorporates criminal history into its algorithm, 
this assessment will almost certainly be 
erroneous, and thus decrease the 
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reliability/validity of the risk assessment enter-
prise. 
In contrast, relevant protective factors—
that is, again, traits that are correlated with 
lower risk—are less likely to have been 
considered during the development of an RAI.  
Further, certain types of interventions can 
reduce risk.  If an individual is able to produce 
research showing the presence of protective 
factors not considered in the RAI’s development, 
or that a particular intervention that fits his or 
her criminogenic needs is available, a downward 
adjustment or some alternative to prison may be 
indicated.  In practice, RAI-overrides that can be 
justified on solid evidence will normally be in the 
downward direction.  
Justice/Fairness  
 The legal decision-maker should 
evaluate the fairness of RAIs by ensuring that: 
(1) disparate impacts on major demographic 
groups can be justified on empirical grounds; (2) 
the instrument does not rely on risk factors that 
are barred from consideration by the 
jurisdiction; (3) the risk factors and how they 
were combined are accessible to all parties, 
including the subject of the risk assessment; 
and (4) the subject of the risk assessment is 
provided an explanation of the risk factors and 
the empirical logic behind the RAI, is able to 
contest the RAI analysis of risk factors and its 
results, and can present evidence of protective 
factors. 
12. Are there data that provide information 
about the impact of the RAI on different 
racial groups and other important 
groups? 
Race and sex are protected classes 
under the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  An unresolved legal 
question is whether attempts to avoid unfair 
impacts on these two groups by taking race or 
sex into account in constructing an RAI violates 
equal protection principles.  This can occur in at 
least two ways.  First, as discussed above (see 
query #7), in an attempt to improve accuracy, an 
RAI may be calibrated for each major ethnic 
group, an adjustment that might be called “race-
conscious calibration.”  Second, in an effort to 
assure what some commentators have called 
“classification parity,” false positive rates could 
be adjusted.  For instance, if an RAI produces 
higher false positive rates for blacks or other 
ethnic groups than for whites, risk categories 
could be adjusted so that the risk scores for 
people of color are lowered or the risk scores for 
whites are raised.   
Both race-conscious calibration and 
classification parity explicitly use race as a 
discriminator, a fact that implicates the equal 
protection clause.111  There is a key difference 
between the two types of adjustments, 
however. Unlike classification parity—which 
changes an accurate conclusion about the 
statistical likelihood of recidivism to achieve its 
version of fairness—race-conscious calibration 
serves the important state interests of 
protecting the public and avoiding unnecessary 
incarceration, by rectifying the impact of 
discriminatory practices that unfairly raise one’s 
risk score.  As between the two, race conscious 
calibration is more likely to survive an equal 
protection challenge.  
While no RAI explicitly incorporates race 
as a risk factor (and, according to the Supreme 
Court, would clearly be unconstitutional if it did 
so112), sex—specifically, maleness—is a risk 
factor in several RAIs.  Developers have realized 
that an RAI that is well-calibrated for men may 
not be well-calibrated for women; women do 
not recidivate as often as men, apparently even 
when they are otherwise associated with 
identical risk factors.  From an empirical point of 
view, that situation calls for an RAI validated on 
a female population.  But, again, such an explicit 
use of a protected class could be seen to be 
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violative of the equal protection clause.  For 
instance, in Craig v. Boren,113 the Supreme Court 
struck down a law that allowed women to buy 
alcohol at age 18 while prohibiting alcohol sales 
to males until they are 21, despite evidence that 
men have higher rates of drunk driving.   
Nonetheless, in Wisconsin v. Loomis114 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court suggested that 
discriminating on the basis of sex is permissible 
if it validly helps distinguish between males and 
females in terms of risk.  Loomis’ sentence had 
been enhanced using the COMPAS, which 
specifically took gender into account; Loomis 
argued that this disposition violated due process.  
Although as a result of this framing, the 
Wisconsin court did not explicitly address the 
equal protection issue, it did state, in the course 
of rejecting Loomis’ claim, that “it appears that 
any risk assessment tool which fails to 
differentiate between men and women will 
misclassify both genders.”115   In essence, the 
court was saying, because of its enhancement to 
accuracy, incorporating gender was a narrowly 
tailored means of meeting the state’s interest in 
preventing harm to the public in a cost-efficient 
manner.  
Of the factors typically found in RAIs, 
only race and sex trigger Fourteenth 
Amendment protection and thus require more 
than a rational basis for their use under current 
law.  Nonetheless, it has been argued that the 
Fourteenth Amendment also bars RAIs from 
using poverty or proxies for it (e.g., 
unemployment, location, or house 
ownership),116 based primarily on the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in Bearden v. Georgia117 
that revoking parole for an offender who has 
failed to pay a fine “would be little more than 
punishing him for his poverty,” and “is contrary 
to fundamental fairness.”118  However, no court 
has interpreted Bearden to mean that factors 
related to poverty are anathema in assessing 
either risk or punishment generally;119 Bearden 
itself stated that “a sentencing court can 
consider a defendant’s employment history and 
financial resources in setting an initial 
punishment,”120 and emphasized that the only 
sentencing practice it was barring was the use of 
poverty “as the sole justification for 
imprisonment,”121 which no risk assessment 
instrument does.  
This does not mean that any wealth-
related risk factor is fair game.  Following equal 
protection’s tiered analysis, the use of factors 
other than race and sex—such as age, 
employment status, home life as a child, 
diagnosis or marital status—must still have a 
rational basis.  Because of their minimal 
predictive value, for instance, employment and 
marital status were eventually dropped from 
Virginia’s NVRA.122     
Finally, an RAI might give rise to a 
disparate impact claim rather than a disparate 
treatment claim.  Again, however, if an RAI uses 
neither race nor sex as a risk factor, but only 
produces results that have a disparate racial or 
gender impact, then formal classification is not 
occurring, and use of the RAI is permissible if 
there is any rational basis for doing so, unless  a 
discriminatory purpose can be shown.  While the 
Supreme Court has not always required serious 
animus in its disparate impact cases, it has 
tended to require strong proof of discriminatory 
purpose in criminal cases.123 In any event, 
developers of RAIs are not likely to have 
harbored or intended to implement animus 
toward any given racial group, and in fact 
presumably want to avoid disproportionate 
outcomes.124  Thus, a disparate impact argument 
against RAIs is unlikely to prevail.   
13. Do any of the risk factors in the RAI rely 
on traits that the jurisdiction’s law 
prohibits legal decision-makers from 
considering at sentencing? 
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Independent of equal protection 
concerns are enactments that specifically 
prohibit reliance on certain types of factors in 
punishment decisions.  For instance, Ohio law 
states that “A court that imposes a sentence 
upon an offender for a felony shall not base the 
sentence upon the race, ethnic background, 
gender, or religion of the offender,”125 and 
Tennessee law provides that “Sentencing should 
exclude all considerations respecting race, 
gender, creed, religion, national origin, and 
social status of the individual.”126  Thus, for 
instance, both statutes could be construed to bar 
sex as a risk factor, regardless of the effect of 
that prohibition on accuracy.  Furthermore, 
Tennessee’s prohibition on punishment that 
considers the “social status of the individual” 
might bar consideration of any factors having to 
do with income, employment, marital status, 
and the like.  It is a matter of state law whether 
a sentence that relies in whole or part on an RAI 
that incorporates such factors is “based” on 
those factors or explicitly “considers” them.  If 
so, use of RAIs that include such factors may be 
impermissible.  
14. Are the RAI’s risk factors and the weights 
assigned to them accessible to peer 
reviewers, evaluators, legal decision-
makers and the subjects of the risk 
assessment? 
Some RAIs are developed by private 
companies that claim trade secret protection 
over the algorithm.  For instance, the company 
that produces the COMPAS claims its algorithm 
and the weights it assigns risk factors are 
protected, a claim that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court upheld.127   In such a situation, the identity 
and importance of risk factors can be difficult to 
discern.  For instance, sophisticated reverse 
engineering was required to figure out that, 
while the COMPAS contains over 100 items, over 
half of the risk score is attributable to a single 
factor, the offender’s age.128  Even purportedly 
publicly developed instruments can be less than 
transparent.  Congress required that the RAI 
developed under the federal First Step Act, the 
PATTERN, be made public,129 but did not require 
that the validation procedure that led to 
development of the instrument nor the data 
underlying it be disclosed. When asked for more 
information, the authors of PATTERN stated that 
state law-driven privacy concerns prevented 
release even of anonymized versions of the data 
to outside researchers.130  A number of states 
have responded to similar requests in the same 
fashion.131  
The integration of sophisticated 
machine learning into RAI construction could 
make RAIs even more opaque, since under some 
versions of that technique the weights assigned 
risk factors and even the identity of those factors 
are inaccessible to humans.132  Furthermore, 
even if the black box can be opened, serious 
interpretation problems can arise.  More 
specifically, as Andrew Selbst and Simon Barocas 
note, some versions of machine learning can be 
either “inscrutable”—meaning that even when a 
model is available for direct inspection it may 
“defy understanding”—or “non-intuitive”—
meaning that even where a model is 
understandable it may “rest on apparent 
statistical relationships that defy intuition.”133  
Even if it turns out that advanced RAIs 
are demonstrably more accurate than simpler 
versions (which is unlikely134), and putting aside 
whether actuarial instruments need to be 
intuitively understandable, algorithms that are 
“inscrutable” are problematic. 135   Neither equal 
protection nor statutory analysis of the type just 
described can take place unless the legal 
decision-maker can discern the risk factors in an 
RAI.  The accuracy of the probabilities and other 
results reached by an RAI cannot be confirmed 
unless the underlying data and the empirical 
analysis using it can be evaluated by others.   If 
decision-makers want to avoid “adjustments” of 
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a risk assessment based on factors already 
considered in developing the instrument they 
need to know what those factors are. Perhaps 
most importantly, without transparency litigants 
cannot adequately contest the facts leading to 
the RAI’s results.  
 
To aid both independent peer reviewers 
and those involved in the legal process, 
developers should provide “a complete de-
scription of the design and testing process . . . , 
[a] list of factors that the tool uses and how it 
weighs them, [t]he thresholds and data used to 
determine labels for risk scores, . . . [t]he 
outcome data used to develop and validate the 
tool at an aggregate and privacy-protecting 
level--disclosing breakdown of rearrests by 
charge, severity of charge, failures to appear, 
age, race, and gender—[and] clear definitions of 
what an instrument forecasts and for what time 
period.”136  
 
Some caselaw backs up these 
requirements. In Gardner v. Florida,137 the 
defendant argued that, before his sentence was 
imposed, he had a due process right to discover 
and rebut the contents of his pre-sentence 
report.  The Supreme Court agreed, stating:   
“Our belief that debate between adversaries is 
often essential to the truth-seeking function of 
trials requires us also to recognize the 
importance of giving counsel an opportunity to 
comment on facts which may influence the 
sentencing decision . . . ”.138  While Gardner was 
limited to the death penalty context, the Court 
came to a similar conclusion in Roviaro v. United 
States,139 a simple drug case.  There, the Court 
held that the identity of confidential informants 
must be revealed to the defendant when the 
informant possesses facts that are highly 
relevant to the defense. Roviaro establishes that 
even strong claims of a need for secrecy (here 
protecting an informant) should not prevail 
when the information is crucial to the case. 
While Roviaro has been given short shrift in more 
recent lower court decisions,140 its central 
rationale has not been abandoned.141 
 
Scholars have also made sub-constitu-
tional arguments in favor of open algorithms. 
Danielle Citron has contended that private 
companies that seek public money for products 
that affect public policy should not be able to 
hide behind trade secret laws,142 and Rebecca 
Wexler has noted that companies’ concern 
about algorithmic disclosure giving competitors 
an advantage or discouraging innovation are 
overblown, especially if protective orders or in 
camera review requirements are imposed.143   
The opacity problems created by machine 
learning have received special attention.  Most 
prominently, scholars have argued for a “right to 
explanation,”144 a right that the European Union 
has explicitly recognized in its General Data 
Privacy Regulation.145   
 
15. Are the subjects of the risk assessment 
provided an explanation of the empirical 
basis of the RAI and the opportunity to 
contest and rebut its results?  
In State v. Guise, Judge Appel stated:  
“[O]ne thing is clear: if the state intends to offer 
risk assessments for the court to rely upon in 
sentencing, the defendant has a right to an 
adequate opportunity to attack it. If the court 
does not give the defendant an adequate 
opportunity to attack the statistical evidence, it 
should not be utilized in sentencing.”146   Yet in 
many jurisdictions, the adversarial process 
provided at criminal trials does not exist post-
conviction.  Even at sentencing, the adjudication 
process can be very informal, at least outside of 
capital cases.147   Defendants are entitled to be 
present during sentencing, but do not have a 
right to testify in the normal sense, only a right 
to “allocution” (a statement by the defendant 
that can be restricted to a plea for mercy);148  
funding for expert testimony is also minimal  
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outside of capital cases.149  In most states and in 
federal court, neither Daubert nor any rule 
resembling it applies at sentencing.150  The 
process due at other post-conviction 
proceedings is even more minimal.151 All of this 
makes relevance, accuracy and fairness 
challenges difficult.  
In the absence of a full-blown 
adversarial process, other procedural 
components are crucial. Most importantly, the 
subject of the risk assessment should be able to 
raise claims about whether the RAI was reliably 
administered, in two ways.  First, the subject 
should be able to attack the accuracy of a 
conclusion that a particular risk factor is present 
(e.g., the validity of an assumed arrest or 
conviction, the applicability of a diagnosis, or the 
failure to complete a program that in fact was 
not available to the offender).  Second, the 
subject should be able to proffer protective 
factors that were not considered by the 
developers of the instrument (e.g., completion 
of a treatment or educational program, changes 
in employment status); researchers are 
beginning to identify a number of such factors.152  
Third, the state’s evaluator should provide 
information about any perceived protective 
factors that the subject does not identify, 
especially when subjects do not have access to 
their own experts.  As a supplement to these 
process rights, the legal decision-maker should 
provide a written explanation for any decision 
based on risk, one that should be particularly 
detailed if an adjustment to the RAI results 
occurs.    
RAIs should also be subject to legislative 
and administrative review.  A number of state 
legislatures have mandated that sentencing 
judges or corrections officials use a “validated 
risk assessment tool,”153 and in other states the 
state sentencing commission,154 the department 
of corrections,155 the state courts generally,156 
or, as California has done with respect to pretrial 
risk assessments, the courts in each 
jurisdiction,157 have taken on the task.  In the 
federal First Step Act, Congress directed that (1) 
the Attorney General develop and release a “risk 
and needs assessment system” to determine the 
“recidivism risk of each prisoner” following “an 
objective and statistically validated method,” (2) 
a panel of researchers approve the instrument, 
(3) the instrument be annually validated, and (4) 
Bureau of Prison staff “demonstrate 
competence in administering the System, 
including interrater reliability, on a biannual 
basis.”158  While the analysis of the RAI could be 
under the auspices of the department of 
corrections or the sentencing commission, 
ideally the type of research panel  referred to in 
the Act would consist of experts outside of the 
department, perhaps at a university, as 
suggested in the discussion of query #9.    
This type of independent review of RAIs 
would also take the burden off individual legal 
decision-makers, who might have difficulty 
answering many of the inquiries outlined in this 
primer.  In fact, such a panel could presumptively 
resolve many of the relevance, validity, and 
fairness issues described above.  Specifically, 
while the issues set out in 4 (selecting risk-
reducing interventions), 10 (ensuring the 
evaluator has been adequately trained and has 
properly scored the RAI), 11 (deciding whether 
adjustments to the RAI results should occur), 14 
(ensuring that the contents of the RAI are 
accessible), and 15 (ensuring adequate 
adversarial testing) would have to be handled by 
judges, parole boards and correctional officials 
on a case-by-case basis, the remaining issues 
could be addressed in the first instance by the 
outside entity.  
CONCLUSION—THE NEED FOR A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF RISK 
  Until recently, the post-conviction use 
of risk assessment instruments has received little 
attention from the legal community, at least in 
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comparison to the vast literature focused on 
defining crimes, defenses, and the amount of 
punishment that particular types of offenders 
“deserve.”  Without a jurisprudence of risk, 
judges and other legal decision-makers have 
very little guidance on which risk assessment 
instruments, if any, are worthy of consideration, 
how to evaluate their results, and how much 
weight to give those results.  Researchers who 
develop these instruments do not have a clear 
idea of the outcome measures that the law 
considers relevant, the types of risk factors they 
may or may not consider, or the psychometric 
properties that ensure courts will rely on the 
instrument they develop.  In the meantime, to 
the extent risk assessment influences the post-
conviction process, the fate of offenders, the 
safety of the public, and even the pace of 
incarceration rates are subject to a hodgepodge 
of inchoate views about the impact an offender’s 
risk should have on disposition.  In addition to 
providing useful information to legal decision-
makers about risk assessment instruments, a 
central aim of this primer is to encourage further 
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